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LIMITING RELITIGATION BY DEFENDANT
CLASS ACTIONS FROM DEFENDANT'S
VIEWPOINT
By THEODORE W. ANDERSON*
and HARRY J. ROPER*
INTRODUCTION
The amendment to Federal Civil Procedure Rule 23 in July,
1966 reflected a basic change in attitude toward limiting relitigation by employing the tools of collaterial estoppel and res judicata in general and in the context of the related procedural device of class actions in particular. With the new rule, the foundation for class actions and the concomitant res judicata effect
of the class action decision shifted from a conceptualism involving various real and imaginary jural relations' to the pragmatic
considerations of managing suits involving large numbers of persons. 2 The new rule, by its own language, became a ready-made

solution with built-in descriptions of the kinds of administrative
problems it was to solve.
*Members of the Illinois Bar and partners in the firm of Pendleton, Neuman, Williams & Anderson. The authors wish to express their appreciation
for the assistance given by Walter P. Maksym, Jr. of the Journal'sstaff.
'For a discussion of previous Rule 23 see 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAC23.08 et seq., (2d ed. 1969). There apparently remains some place for
jural relations in class actions under the new rule. See Snyder v. Harris,
394 U.S. 332 (1969).
2 The new rule is as follows:
Rule 23. Class Actions.
(a) PREREQUISITES TO A CLASS ACTION. One or more members of
a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only
if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) CLASS ACTIONS MAINTAINABLE. An action may be maintained
as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied,
and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of
(A)
inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to
individual members of the class which would establish incompatible
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests
of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate
final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect
to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to
TICE
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In its first five years, the new rule has proven its effectiveness primarily in plaintiff class situations, particularly, in the
the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced bv or against
members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the
difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class
action.
(c)
DETERMINATION BY ORDER WHETHER CLASS ACTION To BE
MAINTAINED; NOTICE; JUDGMENT; ACTIONS CONDUCTED PARTIALLY AS

CLASS ACTIONS.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order
whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this subdivision
may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3),
the court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice
practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all
members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The notice
shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him from
the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment,
whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion
may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action
under subdivision (b) (1) or (b) (2), whether or not favorable to the
class, shall include and describe those whom the court finds to be
members of the class. The judgment in an action maintained as a
class action under subdivision (b) (3), whether or not favorable to
the class, shall include and specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in subdivision (c) (2) was directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues, or (B)
a class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a
class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and
applied accordingly.
(d)
ORDERS IN CONDUCT OF ACTIONS. In the conduct of actions
to which this rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1)
determining the course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of evidence
or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the
class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given
in such manner as the court may direct to some or all of the members
of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment,
or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the
representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or
defenses, or otherwise to come into the action; (3) imposing conditions
on the representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the
pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation of absent persons, and that the action proceed accordingly;
(5) dealing with similar procedural matters. The orders may be combined with an order under Rule 16, and may be altered or amended as
may be desirable from time to time.
(e) DISMISSAL OR COMPROMISE. A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice
of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members
of the class in such manner as the court directs.
(As amended Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966.)
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civil rights area,3 antitrust liability suits4 and in securities

cases. 5 The plaintiffs in these actions are non-compulsory
classes where the individual members may be easily excluded on
their own motion. The difference between the old rule and the
new rule in this kind of litigation is that the former required a
positive act on the part of individual class members in coming
together to form the class; the new rule permits the representative to define the class and requires a positive action on the
part of the class member to exclude himself.- The change is
primarily responsible for the increase in massive class actions
where the recovery for the individual class member is not substantial. Under the previous rule, the individual, though perhaps suffering some damage, would have little interest or incentive to include himself in the class. Under the new rule, he has
no reason to seek exclusion.
The new rule has been used to a far lesser extent in defendant class actions; most of the litigated cases are patent infringement suits. 7 The need for improved procedures for han-

dling multiple defendant situations and the shift in focus from
jural relations to pragmatic considerations of judicial administration will undoubtedly bring new procedural approaches to
limiting relitigation, augmenting or supplanting the defendant
class action. In fact, on the eve of publication of this edition of
the Journal,the Supreme Court has handed down its decision in
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation,8 which effects basic changes in the doctrine of res judicata and collateral estoppel in both patent cases and litigation
in general. It is this doctrine which undergirds the whole class
action mechanism as it applies to defendant classes. Like the
3 Brooks v. Briley, 274 F. Supp. 538 (M.D. Tenn. 1967); Norwalk Core
v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 42 F.R.D. 617 (D. Conn. 1967); St. Augustine
H.S. v. Louisiana H.S. Ath. Ass'n, 270 F. Supp. 767 (E.D. La. 1967); and
Snyder v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Illinois, 286 F. Supp. 927 (N.D.
Ill. 1968).
4Caceres v. Int'l Air Transp. Ass'n, 46 F.R.D. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
Philadelphia v. Morton Salt Co., 385 F.2d 122 (3d Cir. 1967) Knuth
v. Erie-Crawford Dairy Coop. Ass'n, 395 F.2d 420 (3d Cir. 1968); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (E.D. Pa. 1968);
and Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
5 Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N..Y. 1968); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968) ; Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d
94 (10th Cir. 1968) ; Herbst v. Able, 278 F. Supp. 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) ; and
Hohmann v. Packard Instrument Co., 399 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1968).
6 FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c) (2).
Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Electronics, Inc., 285
F. Supp. 714 (N.D. I1. 1968) ; Research Corp. v. Pfister Associated Growers,
Inc., 301 F. Supp. 497 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Technitrol, Inc. v. Control Data
Corp., 164 U.S.P.Q. 552 (D. Md. 1970); Northern Natural Gas Co. v.
Grounds, 292 F. Supp. 619 (D. Kan. 1968); and Dorfmann v. Boozer, 13
F.R.S.2d, 23c.1, Case 1 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also William & Harmon, Class
Actions: A Tool for Patent Enforcement, presented at THE LAWYERS INSTITUTE OF THE JOHN MARSHALL LAW SCHOOL (1970).
8 39 U.S.L.W. 4506 (May 3, 1971).
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1966 amendment to Rule 23, Blonder-Tongue shifts the entire
emphasis from one of jural relations (Were the defendants in
the first and second suits in privity?) to one of pragmatism:
The broader question is whether it is any longer tenable to afford
a litigant more than one full and fair opportunity for judicial
resolution of the same issue. The question in these terms includes
as part of the calculus the effect on judicial administration, but it
also encompasses the concern exemplified by Bentham's reference to
the gaming table in his attack on the principle of mutuality of
estoppelY
Taken together, the new rule and Blonder-Tongue cannot help but
produce a marked shift in defendant class actions.
There are fundamental practical differences which call Rule
23 into effect in the plaintiff and defendant situations and, while
the rule itself draws no distinction, the precedents and practical
approaches which have been developed in the plaintiff class cases
have little or no relation to the defendant class action. Pragmatically, the two are worlds apart. There is obviously a considerable difference, for example, between the unidentified consumer in a class action for antitrust damages10 whose individual
recovery may be hardly measurable, and a defendant in a patent
infringement suit who may have a substantial interest in the
outcome of the litigation; the future of his business may even
hinge upon it. In this article we will discuss the defendant
class action from the viewpoint of the defendants, both the
named representatives and the individual class members. Because the patent infringement suit represents the only experience of defendant classes reported under the new rule, the discussion will center around that kind of litigation.
Essentials of a Defendant Class Action - The Patent
Infringement Suit
The most essential element of any defendant class action is
a large number of persons whose potential liability rests on a
common set of issues. The distinctions which Rule 23 draws
within this fundamental requirement lie principally in the degrees to which a judgment against one class member would affect another in the absence of the class action. If the judgment
would have a binding effect from a practical or legal viewpoint,
the case is a perfect candidate for a compulsory class action
under Rule 23(b) (1) or (b) (2).11 If, on the other hand, the
judgment would leave the door open for further litigation, but
there are common issues, the class action becomes more a ques9Id.
10

See, e.g., Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D.

452 (E.D. Pa. 1968) ; and Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d
Cir. 1968).
11 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTicE
23.35 [1] and [2).
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tion of judicial efficiency and a matter of the judge's discretion
under Rule 23(b) (3).12

At least superficially, a good many patent cases seem to fit
the broad requirement of common issues; a large segment of industry may be using a process, for example, which a patent
owner sees as an infringement. Whether a judgment as to one
alleged infringer has the binding effect on others necessary to
qualify it for a compulsory class was a debatable point before
the Supreme Court's decision in Blonder-Tongue. While the
Court dealt with the collateral estoppel effect of an invalidity determination in Blonder-Tongue, it by no means put an end to
the argument over the propriety of compulsory class infringement actions. The estoppel announced in Blonder-Tongue is a
unilateral estoppel in the sense that a validity determination
will not be binding on non-parties, while an invalidity determination can benefit non-parties. In any event, the practical considerations involved in administrating the lawsuit may well lead
to the conclusion that class action will result in a net saving of
judicial time. The alternative is separate suits against all the
recalcitrant infringers. While some of the cases might be consolidated, the special venue statute limits the effectiveness of
that approach, at least for the trial stage. 13 (For pretrial, of
course, transfer under 28 U.S.C. §1407 may be available.) The
class action, therefore, may well seem a useful device to cut down
the amount of time and the expense of trying the common issues. On the other hand, if the patent is held invalid in an early
full and fair trial against a defendant and in a district of the
patentee's own choosing, the new doctrine of collateral estoppel
under the Blonder-Tongue decision may preclude relitigation.
While the patent infringement case may seem superficially
appropriate for a class action, the task of fitting the facts of the
case to one of the categories of Rule 23 is no easy matter. For
maximum effectiveness, the class action should be a compulsory
action under Rule 23 (b) (1) or (b) (2). Yet, as mentioned earlier, it is open to serious question whether the plaintiff can institute a compulsory action under Rule 23(b) (1) . 14 And Rule
23(b) (2) seems to require, by its terms, initiation by the defendant as a declaratory judgment plaintiff. However, the law
in this area is quite obviously in its infancy and much remains
12 Compare Technograph and Technitrol, note 7 supra.
13 Dist. Cts.; Venue Act, 28 U.S.C. §1400(b) (1964) limits venue in
patent infringement actions to either the judicial district where the defendant resides or one where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business. Schnell v. Peter
Eckrich & Sons Inc., 365 U.S. 260 (1961); Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335
(1960) ; Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957).
14 See Technitrol, Inc. v. Control Data Corp., 164 U.S.P.Q. 552 (D. Md.
1970).

1971]

Defendant Class Actions

to be seen. It is fairly clear, however, that plaintiff and, in some
cases, the judiciary,'15 will consider the class action appropriate.
The question of this article is: Where does this leave the defendant and the class members?
VIEWPOINT OF REPRESENTATIVE DEFENDANT

Every class action needs at least one representative defendant, that is, a defendant whose case will stand for the class
members not present in the courtroom. The representative defendant will usually find he has little to gain from his position in
the class action. He can, of course, be assured of representation
by counsel of his choice, but that assurance is obviously available to him without the necessity of a class action. On the other
hand, the representative finds himself in a case which will prove
to be more complex than the more usual infringement action.
Unless the class action procedure is thoroughly considered between attorney and client at the outset, and unless some initial
decisions are made concerning the representative's posture in
the case, the representative may not understand his attorney's
procedural involvements - and the incident fees - which are
inevitable in class action procedures, but which may well seem
unnecessary to the representative's immediate interests.
Assuming the class action is initiated by the plaintiff's
original complaint, the first question the representative faces is
whether to oppose the action ab initio. The particular facts of
each case quite obviously control, but the attitude of the courts
on the propriety of class action infringement suits in general is
by no means uniform. A sharp difference in attitude is apparent, for example, between two cases in the district courts in Illinois, Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Electronics,'8 and Research Corp. v. Pfister Associated Growers, Inc.17 on
the one hand, and a case in the District of Maryland, Technitrol,
Inc. v. Control Data Corp., 8 on the other. All three cases were
decided before Blonder-Tongue. In Technograph, the District
Court concluded that the requirements of all three sections of
Rule 23 were met; that is, a class action under §§ (b) (1), (b) (2)
and (b) (3) was proper.' 9 In Technitrol, on the other hand, the
court said:
I doubt if the prerequisite requirements of Rule 23(a) have
been met; even graver doubt as to (b) (1) (A) and (B); the
definite conclusion that a class action cannot be maintained under
(b) (2) ; and the definite conclusion that even if (b) (3) could be
15 In Technograph, note 7 supra the initiative for the class action came
from the court.
L6Technograph, note 7 supra.
17 Research, note 7 supra.
I Technitrol, note 7 supra.
19 285 F. Supp. at 722.
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met, the benefits would be insufficient 2to
justify the risk of error
0
in permitting a class action to be filed.
The facts of the two cases were, of course, quite different, but
the difference in attitude of the two courts is clear. Just as
divisive a conflict exists in the two courts' decisions on the question of whether the special venue requirements of 28 U.S.C.
§1400(b) limit the expansiveness of the class. In Technograph,
the court avoided the venue problem.21 In Technitrol, the court
said:
. . . I think that it is highly questionable that Rule 23 was intended to cross-out the specific venue provisions of 28 U.S.C.

§1400 (b) ....

22

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Technitrol decision is the consideration of balancing "the risk of error" on
the one hand and "the benefits" of judicial economy which might
result on the other. Here is expression of what may well be
the overriding consideration in most decisions on the propriety
of the class action, at least in the lower courts. If the benefits
are great enough, the class action is at least worth the effort,
even if there might be some procedural flaw or even error in the
formation. In fact, the "error" may well be only ephemeral if the defendant class wins, the class members will never raise
the question; if the defendant class loses, the question can be
decided in the collateral action for infringement against the
class member. This seems quite a revolutionary approach and
perhaps an excessively pragmatic approach to decision making
in the lower courts.
In any event, the preceding discussion should indicate some
of the issues which may be presented at the outset of the litigation by the representative party. The more overriding practical
question, however, is: should the class action be opposed at all
and, if not, should the representative take full control of the action on behalf of the class or should he limit his activities solely
to the substantive elements of his own defense? By taking full
control, the defendant will obviously increase his total activity in
the action and without some kind of financing arrangement with
other class members may well increase attorney fees by substantial amounts. On the other hand, if he decides to limit his
activity to his substantive defenses, he may be putting the plaintiff in control of procedural aspects which may be significant in
the substantive trial of the case, framing the common issues to
be tried, for example, a matter in which the plaintiff and defendant will not usually be in complete harmony. These problems
20
21
22

164 U.S.P.Q. at 552.
285 F. Supp. at 725.
164 U.S.P.Q. at 552.
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are generally compounded if the plaintiff or the court designates
multiple representatives who then must endeavor to resolve
these matters among themselves.
The representative's initial decisions, therefore, are not easy
ones to make. In order to shed some light on the practical dynamics of the action, we offer the following discussion of three
more important problems which are involved in defendant class
actions and which should be considered by the representative
party at the outset: (1) the procedural details in establishing
the class action; (2) the problems which are likely to be inzurred with settlement proposals; and (3) financing the defense.
Establishing the Class Action
The two basic and related procedural issues of any class action are (1) what substantive issues will be adjudicated, and (2)
who is in the class?
In the patent infringement situation, the invalidity or unenforceability defenses are usually common to all those persons
who come within the scope of plaintiff's construction of his
claims. The infringement issue, on the other hand, is more individual and unique to each person interested in the validity of
the patent. However, it is certainly not unusual for the defendant to raise the question of invalidity "if construed to cover my
use. ' 23 The representative defendant may have a substantial
interest in seeing that this kind of defense is properly raised.
Obviously, there is a good deal of room for creativity in framing
this kind of common issue, but two possibilities are: (1) to put
in issue an alleged infringement which can be considered representative of the class members, or (2) to put in issue an alleged
infringement as to the named representative. On the other hand,
it may be in the representative's interest to leave the issue for
the possible subsequent infringement suit; if the question of "invalid if construed" is not decided in the class action, it may well
be a defense later on. The possibility of this kind of defense being raised in subsequent suits may well render the class action
entirely ineffective or at least impractical from the viewpoint
of saving judicial effort.
If infringement issues are out of the case entirely, the question of class identity presents some definitional problems; ideally
all the persons using the alleged invention should be class members, but a class definition to that effect comes very close to begging the question. Consider, for example, a case where the plaintiff is successful in the class action and subsequently brings suit
against a class member. If the class were composed of "all in23 3 A. DELLER,
therein.

WALKER ON PATENTS,

§476 (1937) and cases collected
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fringers," the alleged class member could raise the infringement
issue and a priori the validity issue; by denying infringement, he
is denying membership in the class against whom the validity
adjudication is binding.
In the Technograph litigation, the problem was approached
by defining the class in terms of persons who actually received a
notification by the plaintiff; this then described a group of identifiable persons.2 4 In addition, the class action order included all
persons who practiced the process of certain representative
claims; the members of this group were not specifically identified
but the language, nevertheless, attempted to bring in any other
persons who should be entitled to any favorable decision which
the court might reach.2 5 A similar notification approach was
2
employed in Research. 6
One of the practical problems which should be mentioned in
connection with class definitions is the mechanism of notification.
While each case must be considered on its own facts, an official
notification mailed to each identifiable class member should be
sufficient in most cases.27 Where the names or some class mem28
bers are not known, publication should also be employed.
Settlement Possibilities
To return to the plaintiff class action for the sake of a comparison, that kind of proceeding facilitates face-to-face settlement negotiations by placing the defendant who is willing to
concede liability on one side of the table and the plaintiff class
as an entity on the other. The defendant decides what a settlement is worth, and the representatives, perhaps with counsel or
control from the class or the court, work out a distribution of
the recovery.
In the defendant class action for patent infringement, on the
other hand, the question of liability for infringement is not in
issue and a complete settlement cannot be achieved simply between the plaintiff and the class representative. The representative is usually unaware of the exposure of the class members
to possible liability and is thus in no position to negotiate on
their behalf. Nevertheless, the possibility of settlement certainly should be an element of any lawsuit and some procedure
should at least be possible.
See the descriptions of subclasses 4, 5 and 6, 285 F. Supp. at 726-27.
This might well include existing licensees, for example, as well as alleged2 infringer. See subclasses 1, 2 and 3,285 F. Supp. at 725-26.
6 Research Corp. v. Pfister Associated Growers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 497
(N.D. Ill. 1969).
27 This approach was taken in Research.
28 Both devices were employed in Technograph.
24
22
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Unfortunately, throwing defendants together in the class
does not necessarily encourage intercommunications which
might lead to a group settlement proposal. The Manual 9 suggests close supervision of any class intercommunication, at least
when it involves attorneys,3 0 and actually proposes a local rule
preventing such communication without prior court approval.31
The attitude expressed in the Manual and in the proposed local
rule, part of which is set out in the margin,3 2 certainly has to
create a chilling effect on settlement communications between
class members. Yet it is doubtful that this was its intended
purpose. It may well be that some of the policy considerations
behind this attitude are the result of courts' experiences in plaintiff class cases; but the restrictions on communication seem misplaced in the defendant class action and should be re-examined,
in the authors' view, at least as applied to the defendant patent
infringement situation.
Accepting the restriction on communications for present
purposes, what are some possible procedures for settling the
lawsuit?
(1)
settlement strictly between the plaintiff and
the representatives without regard to settlement as to
non-party class members;
(2)
settlements on individual bases between the
plaintiff and the individual class members;
(3)
settlement negotiations for the entire class
conducted by the representatives under court direction.
In considering any of these or other approaches, it must be remembered that under Rule 23 (e) the court has to approve any
settlement arrangement. 8
The first proposal, while perhaps most practical for the unwilling representatives, who may very rightly feel they owe no
special duty to the other class members, has a distinct disadvantage from the viewpoint of judicial administration. The only
29

C.

MANUAL

FOR COMPLEX

and A. MILLER,
ld., Part I §1.61.
Id., Part II, §1.61.

WRIGHT

so
81

AND MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION

FEDERAL

82 1.61 Suggested Local Rule No. 7 -

PRACTICE AND

[for use with

PROCEDURE

(1969)].

Prevention of PotentialA buses of

Clas8 Actions.
In every potential and actual class action under Rule 23, F.R.Civ.P.,
all parties thereto and their counsel are hereby forbidden, directly or
indirectly, orally or in writing, to communicate concerning such action
with any potential or actual class member not a formal party to the
action without the consent of and approval of the communication by
order of the Court. Any such proposed communication shall be presented to the Court in writing with a designation of or description o all
addressees and with a motion and proposed order for prior approval by
the Court of the proposed communication and proposed addressees.
Id., Part II, §1.61 at 110.
88 Note 2 supra.
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real justification for any class action of this kind is economy of
judicial effort. If the court puts substantial amounts of effort
in setting up the class and going through discovery and even a
trial, it would hardly be consistent with the fundamental policy
to settle one class action and begin another with a new representative. The result is a net increase in judicial time rather
than economy. The propriety of this kind of settlement has not,
to the authors' knowledge, been put before a court. When it is,
we expect the court's enthusiasm will be in inverse relation to
the amount of time devoted to getting the class action under
way. Yet, the unwilling representative should certainly have the
complete right to settle his own differences.
Of course, if the representative parties can arrive at some
settlement agreement acceptable to them, then the proposal
should be made available on equal terms to all class members
under court direction. Any class member who does not wish to
settle on the proposed basis might be invited to come in and
take over the defense as a representative party. This might
prove very expensive for a non-representative class member who
would consider it coercive and improperly imposed upon him by
counsel not of his choosing.
Similarly, under the second alternative, the individual class
members should certainly be allowed to settle their own disputes.
The problem here is the extensive amount of time required of
the court and the parties in considering individual settlement
proposals. Any individual settlement considered by the court
necessarily invites a response from the representatives; indeed,
it may compel a response where the defense involves charges of
misuse or fraud in the procurement. It has been suggested, for
example, by a Justice Department attorney that settlement in the
latter situation might well involve antitrust implications, if not
a violation.3 4 While this may represent the view of the Justice
Department, it will probably fair less well in courts interested
in settling lawsuits; it did not curtail the one instance of individual settlement in the Technograph litigation. 35 The point
is, however, that the individual settlement proposals have a tendency to delay the action.
34
I suggest that, if a defendant has a substantial and reasonable
basis for believing that the plaintiff's patent has been procured by
fraud, the defendant cannot thereafter settle that infringement suit
either by taking a license under the patent or by admitting its validity
in any manner.
Wilson, The Legitimate & Illegitimate in Patent and Know-How Licensing,
a paper presented at THE LAWYERS INSTITUTE OF THE JOHN MARSHALL

LAW SCHOOL (February 20, 1970).

35 On the eve of trial, one member agreed to pay a six-figure sum for
settlement. The court subsequently approved the settlement.
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The third alternative of class settlement through the representatives requires a willingness on the part of the representatives to undertake the additional effort required, and a willingness on the part of the court to recognize that some intercommunication between the representatives and the class members
is required if any group proposal is to result. In most cases, the
degree of court supervision should require no more than periodic
reports by counsel on the progress of the negotiations. To prevent any abuse which might be of concern, the court can establish guidelines at an early pretrial conference. There should be
no need, however, for the court to overview the communications
between the representative attorneys and the class members;
and, absent some real evidence of abuse, such communications
should be accorded the usual attorney-client immunities.
Financing the Defense
But, who should pay the attorney's fees for all the procedural involvements which a class action inevitably generates?
It is neither healthy from the viewpoint of promoting friendly
relations between the public and the judiciary, nor indeed fair,
to saddle the unwilling representative defendant with costs and
attorney's fees incurred for protecting class members but not
necessary for protecting his own interests. Some such fees can
be expected, however, and must be incurred if adequacy of representation is to be a meaningful element of the action. Financing
the action, therefore, should be a first order concern to the representative defendant and to the court in order to avoid any problems of inadequacy of representation which might subsequently
develop after the class action has proceeded well down the road to
conclusion. The texts and digests on federal practice have given
the subject some attention and recognition, but only as it involves the attorneys' fees of a successful plaintiff class or a fund
held by the plaintiff for the benefit of a defendant class 6
The philosophy expressed in granting recovery of costs and
attorneys' fees in plaintiff class actions seems equally applicable
to defendant classes and their representatives if an appropriate
37
mechanism can be developed for accomplishing this end.
While there appears to be no federal precedent for an award
of attorneys' fees to a successful defendant class from a fund
held by plaintiff, the state courts have used this equitable ap3113B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.91 (2d ed. 1969); 2 W. B3ARRON
& A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §570.1 (C. Wright ed.
1961); C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS §72 (2d ed.
1963); Annot., 8 L. Ed. 2d 894.
37 The court in Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U.S. 567 (1886) said:
When many persons have a common interest in a trust property
or fund, and one of them, for the benefit of all and at his own cost and
expense, brings a suit for its preservation or administration, the court
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proach.3 8 In federal practice, "the equitable principle underlying
such awards by the courts is still expanding."' 3 9

In making the required determination of adequacy of representation, 40 the court will undoubtedly consider the financial resources of the representative defendants, their size and standing
relative to the class, the make-up of the class, and the extent of

the exposure to liability by.the representative defendants." But,
in addition to these "adequacy" considerations, some consideration should be given to the possibilities of interparty financing.
The financing problem is not simply a matter of the repre-

sentative defendant soliciting the other class members.

The Ju-

dicial Panel on Multidistriet Litigation has recognized a potential

for abuse in the solicitation of class members for funds or agreements to pay fees and expenses. Thus, the Manual states:
In absence of some preventive action by the Court, formal
parties to the action or counsel for the formal parties may directly

or indirectly, without knowledge or consent of the Court, solicit
from the potential or actual members of the class (or subclasses)
who are not formal parties, funds for attorneys' fees and expenses,
or agreements to pay fees and expenses. The solicitation may be
direct or indirect. To the party solicited, solicitation may appear
to be an authorized activity approved by the Court, simply by reference to the title of the Court, the style of the action, the name of
the judge, and to official processes. Such unapproved solicitation
may be of doubtful ethical propriety and may result in well founded
42
dissatisfaction with the judicial management of the action.
of equity in which the suit is brought will order that the plaintiff be
reimbursed his outlay from the property of the trust, or by proportional
contribution from those who accept the benefits of his efforts.
Id. at 582.
The court in Burden Cen. Sugar Ref. Co. v. Ferris Sugar Mfg. Co., 87
F. 810 (1898) said:
It is a familiar and well-established doctrine of equity that, where
a suit has been instituted and carried on for the benefit of many, all
who come in to avail themselves of the benefits of the decree obtained
under the litigation shall bear their proportion of the expense. The bill
in this case was filed, not only in behalf of the complainant, but of all
other creditors of the defendant corporation who might join in the suit
and contribute to the expense thereof. The exceptors to the master's
report intervened in this case, and were admitted upon that condition,
and therefore must pay their proportionate share of the expense of the
litigation. One jointly interested with others in a common fund, who in
good faith maintains the necessary litigation to save it from waste, and
secures its proper application, is entitled in equity to the reimbursement
of his costs, as between the solicitor and the client, either out of the
fund itself, or by proportionate contributions from those who received
the benefits of the litigation.
Id. at 811-12.
38 German Evangelical St. Marcus Congregation v. Archambault, 404
S.W.2d 705 (S. Ct. Mo. 1966), where the court awarded attorney fees to
representative of defendant class out of perpetual care fund held by plaintiff.
39 Judge Rifkind speaking in Paris v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 94 F.
Supp.4 0 792, 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (4).
41 See Technogr'aph, 285 F. Supp. at 721.
42 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX AND MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION, [for use with
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As mentioned above in connection with settlement, the potential
for abuse here may be greater in the plaintiff class situation than
in the defendant class action.
The need for restrictions on financing procedures certainly
seems less necessary in the case of the presumably sophisticated
class members in a patent infringement situation than it might
be, for example, in a consumer plaintiff class action. A representative infringement defendant, therefore, might well persuade the court that the restrictions should not apply. On the
other hand, the need for freedom within the defendant class to
organize some broad financial support for an adequate defense
seems more necessary than in the plaintiff class.
The Manual, however, makes no exception for the defendant
class and the representative may expect to receive some indication of the court's concern in this area. How then can the defense be financed?
(1)
Solicitation under direction of the court to prevent
abuse is one possibility. The question here is the degree of supervision. While there may be some justification for the court's
reviewing a blanket solicitation of class members, there should
be no need for reviewing every communication between class
members and the representatives. All that would seem necessary
is an initial notification to class members, perhaps in the class
action notice itself, that the court is not approving or disapproving any financing arrangements. At the least, this should prevent the kind of misconception which caused the concern expressed in the "passage" quoted above.
(2)
A large number of representative parties, as in Re3
search, may at least appear to be one solution to the problem.4
While there can be some decrease in expenses with multiple
representatives, the number of such parties is limited by venue
considerations. 44 Moreover, the fortuitousness of being subject
to suit in the district where the class action is brought is no reason for being subjected to the sometimes overwhelming expenses
of the litigation. In any event, in most cases, this will not be a
complete answer to the financing problem. Furthermore, it appears that the greater the number of active representatives, the
greater are the problems of class coordination.
(3)
Taxing the defined class members by court order is
another possibility. This certainly would be a departure from
the general American policy against taxing attorneys' fees.
C. WRIGHT and A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

(1970) §1.61.

PROCEDURE (1969)]

43 Research Corp. v. Pfister Associated Growers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 497
(N.D. Ill. 1969). In this case there were nineteen named representative de
fendants.
44
3B J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.96 (2d ed. 1969).
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Nevertheless, at least with respect to some costs, it may well be
a necessity where all else fails. 45 Here again, the power of the
court to tax all class members and concomitant venue and process questions become paramount.
These various approaches to financing are discussed only as
possibilities under the developing law. The important point is
that the occasional expression of concern for abuse should not
curtail discussion of the real need for some kind of interclass
financing.
VIEWPOINT OF THE NON-PARTY CLASS MEMBER

The non-party class member is usually in a far more enviable position than his representative. If he is a compulsory class
member, 4 he can sit back and watch the action proceed. If the
representatives are successful, he has had virtually a free ride.
If the representatives are unsuccessful, he will still have saved
substantial attorney fees, and he can always challenge the adequacy of representation 41 when the plaintiff seeks to adjudicate
the infringement issue in a subsequent action.
There are, however, some exceptions to this apparent state
of Utopia. If the class member's exposure is great enough, he
may be less than content at not being in control of his destiny,
and at being "foreclosed by" the ideas of other class members
who are participating representatives. This is true, though he
may subsequently raise various defenses in a later personal phase
of the litigation. A class member in this position may seek exclusion if the Class Action Order permits it; he may challenge
the entire proceeding as it relates to him on various grounds,
although his arguments may well be rejected as premature; or
he may seek intervention, thereby. becoming a representative
party.
In considering the possibility of intervention, the class member has to consider the waiver of any defense which might result
from his participation. If he actively participates, for example,
he can hardly complain at a subsequent date that he was not adequately represented. In the Technograph litigation, the dilemma was resolved to some extent by permitting class members to come in and participate without waiver of any rights to
4 8
challenge the class action.
45 3B

J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.91 (2d ed. 1969).
The great majority of class members in Technograph were compulsory
class members. See Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Electronics, 285 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
4 Adequacy of representation is a constitutional right under the "due
process" clause. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
48 285 F. Supp. at 719.
46
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The member of a non-compulsory class, that is, a (b) (3)
class, has to decide whether to accept the representation or exclude himself. The former has the advantage of providing what
should be a high-quality defense at little or no cost. The latter
will permit the class member to conduct his own defense in a
subsequent lawsuit.
CONCLUSION

There has been a recognized need for means to limit relitigation. The abandonment of the old concepts of mutuality of estoppel and the invoking of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel have offered some relief in various areas of the
law and the new class action under Rule 23 has provided still another mechanism, especially for a plaintiff class.
New Rule 23 and its recent application to defendant class
actions demonstrates the need for special considerations for this
kind of litigation. Both the formal parties and the court should
consider these special elements from the outset of the litigation
if the process is to accomplish its desired ends.
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